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Abstract  
 
In 1990th, the provincial government introduced Ontario Works as a means to help 
social assistance system transfer from a negative financial support program to a 
positive, employment-oriented one. And this is a new stage of Ontario social 
assistance system and it initiated an era that provincial government and municipalities 
work together to provide social assistance services.  
 
Under this background, the paper conducted empirical studies about the regional 
variation of Ontario Works based on OMBI data and found out that the variation of 
Ontario Works in different municipalities is small. No matter from the perspective of 
program cost, administrative practices or program benefits, Ontario Works is a 
universal system across the whole province. So the further question here is since this 
program is similar with each other in different places, why provincial government still 
requires the involvement of municipalities in this field? Why they do not provide a 
provincial wide social assistance system by itself? And there are two main reasons. 
The first is the introduction of Ontario Works is accompanied with the 
decentralization process of provincial government. The engagement of local 
government was considered a significant part of decentralization. And the second 
reason is the fiscal retrenchment of provincial government in Ontario Works. Since 
senior government hopes municipalities could cover part of social assistance costs, it 
should give municipalities some autonomy.  	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1. Introduction 
 
Since Mike Harris came into power in 1995, social assistance in Ontario has been in a 
state of almost constant flux. And after this reform, social assistance system in 
Ontario became an increasingly employment-focused program. Social assistance is no 
longer a “negative” system that just provides benefits to those people who are in need. 
It began to become an “active” policy that helped to improve the attitude, motivation, 
and general “employability” of the unemployed and rapidly attach them to available 
jobs1.  
 
In history, the social assistance system has experienced several changes. From 1967 
to 1995, social assistance was considered as a provincial responsibility and cost-
shared by the provincial and federal government under the Canada Assistance Plan 
(CAP)2. Ottawa offered 50/50 cost-sharing for welfare to the provinces and territories 
on the condition that they should provide social assistance to all people who are “in 
need” without any attached strings. But in 1990, the federal government introduced 
the “cap on CAP”, which limited the size of CAP transfers to three richest provinces: 
Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia. The federal government’s contributions to the 
cost of social assistance system in those provinces would increase 5 percent per year 
rather than covering 50 percent of all costs. In 1995, federal government eventually 
ended its cost commitment to social assistance in Canada. CAP was replaced by the 
Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST), which was a block funding agreement 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Herd, D., Mitchell, A., & Lightman, E. (2005). Rituals of degradation: Administration as policy in 
the ontario works programme. Social Policy & Administration, 39(1), 65-79. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
9515.2005.00425.x 2	  Kneebone, R. D., White, K. G., & University of Calgary. Institute for Advanced Policy Research. 
(2007). Fiscal retrenchment and social assistance in canada. Calgary, Alta: Institute for Advanced 
Policy Research, University of Calgary. 	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that included transfers for health, as well as social assistance and social expenditures. 
At the same time, federal government removed all the standards associated with the 
provincial social assistance system and the only requirement for this transfer was a 
prohibition on provincial residency requirements3. This funding reform lightened the 
financial burden of the federal government in social assistance and gave provincial 
governments more flexibility to design their own social assistance system. And 
Ontario enacted the most extensive reforms of all Canadian provinces in the 1990s. 
 
Generally speaking, Ontario Works is a province-municipal joint program. The 
provincial government is responsible for designing the system and providing funding 
support, while municipalities are delivering services through 37 Consolidated 
Municipal Service Managers and ten District Social Services Administration Boards 
(in Northern Ontario). Therefore, the relationship of the provincial government with 
municipalities is an important aspect of Ontario Works. This paper will explore the 
variation of social assistance benefits in different municipalities at first, and then 
analyze the flexibility of local government in delivering social assistance services. 
This study aims to research Ontario Works from the perspective of provincial-
municipal disentanglement, and try to answer the question “who does what” and “why 
different levels of government have different responsibilities in Ontario Works”.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The literature review of this paper has two components. The first is about literature on 
the regional disparities of social welfares services, and the second component is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Kneebone, R. D., White, K. G., & University of Calgary. Institute for Advanced Policy Research. 
(2007). Fiscal retrenchment and social assistance in canada. Calgary, Alta: Institute for Advanced 
Policy Research, University of Calgary. 
	   8	  
research about Ontario Works. European countries have conducted a lot of research 
about the regional variation of social services. Powell and Boyne hold the opinion that 
the decentralized model of social welfare is likely to give rise to increasing local 
disparities while the centralization would lead to more uniformity. So decentralization 
is the main reason to cause the regional disparities of social welfare services (Powell 
& Boyne, 2000). And some other scholars emphasize the government’s balancing act 
between the principles of local autonomy and the uniformity of welfare services. They 
believed that, from the perspective of regional variation, the post-war social welfare 
system is more likely taking the model called “decentralized universalism”. They 
underline that there is a continuing process and find periods of both centralization and 
decentralization (Burau & Kröger, 2004). In Nordic countries, the decentralization 
trend prospered in the 1990s, but a growing concern about the regional inequity 
became popular in the early of 2000s, which leads to more government control in this 
field (Bergmark & Minas, 2007). Therefore, the regional disparity of social welfare 
services is not a stereotypical issue, but a back-and-forth process. Historically, the 
social welfare service in Europe was a system providing generous and equal benefits 
to all the citizens, so it was based on a high degree of universalism (Kautto & 
Anttonen, 2002). But with the welfare reform, the similarities of social welfare 
services in different regions are not so pronounced. And some Nordic countries, such 
as Sweden, have made some changes to some social welfare services. It gave the local 
government some flexibility in providing social services. And there are many 
empirical studies about the regional variation of Sweden’s social welfare benefit. The 
study of Gun-Britt and Mats showed that in Sweden, the variation of social services in 
different municipalities is not a political issue, but an institutional issue, which means 
that this difference is not because people in different regions have unequal social 
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welfare benefits, but because people in different regions need different public services 
(Gun-Britt & Mats, 2000). But Jensen and Lolle argued that over-decentralization of 
social welfare would inevitably cause inequality. People in some places would enjoy 
higher-level social welfare benefits while others are in a lower level, which is an 
unfair situation (Jensen & Lolle, 2011).  
 
For the research specifically focusing on Ontario Works, although there are a lot of 
studies about the social assistance reform in traditional welfare state, the studies about 
Ontario Works are relatively few. Such research involves three main aspects: the first 
is the local implementation of Ontario Works, which is about how the policy was 
implemented in local government; and the second is studying the Ontario Works 
clients to evaluate whether this system really helps them find jobs and get rid of 
welfare dependency; and the third is studying Ontario Works from the perspective of 
federalism and analyzing the relationship of senior governments and municipalities in 
Ontario Works.  
 
To begin with, some scholars and organizations conducted research about local 
implementation of Ontario Works. After the election of a neo-liberal provincial 
government in 1995, Ontario was in the forefront of social-assistance change. Many 
sweeping reforms were carried out, and a variety of new rules and regulations were 
adopted. Central among these changes was the introduction of “work-based welfare 
reform” (Dean, Andrew & Ernie, 2005). The provincial government hoped that the 
social assistance system in Ontario could transfer from a “negative” income support 
program to a “positive” employment-based system (Peter Graefe, 2006). In order to 
achieve this goal, Ontario Works was introduced in 1997. But after the 
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implementation of this new system, there were some voices of disapproval. As Dean 
Herd said, although the provincial government declared that the new Service Delivery 
System of Ontario Works could reduce the cost through efficiencies, in the real world, 
the cost per case under this new policy increases rather than decreases because of the 
complex administration procedure. Actually, the real purpose of the provincial 
government in introducing this model was cutting caseloads by design (Dean Herd, 
2003). Many applicants were “scared” away by the more complex eligibility 
requirements. And the second challenge of Ontario Works is that in many ways its 
guidelines ran counter to the local vision of welfare (Dean, Andrew & Ernie, 2006). A 
major point of contention was the mandatory nature of Ontario Works, which raised 
problems for many delivery agents who were strongly opposed to compulsion.  
 
Secondly, another tend of research is analyzing Ontario Works from the perspective 
of recipients. For some social assistance recipients, they are unable to make stable 
transitions to labor markets, so they would come into social assistance system again 
and again (Bergmark & Beckman, 2003). Because Ontario Works is an employment-
focused program, an important goal of it is to solve this “recidivism” problem through 
providing employment services (Martin, 2009). So the question here is whether 
current social assistance system effectively helps people find a sustainable job and 
permanently gets rid of government assistance. There are some researchers trying to 
answer this question. The empirical research of Ernie es al showed that most people 
who consistently return to Ontario Works have multiple employment barriers, and 
Ontario Works fails to solve this problem because of its narrow emphasis on job 
replacement and ignore the long-term human resource investments (Ernie, Andrew & 
Dean, 2007). Currently, Ontario Works took the Labor Force Attachment or Work-
	   11	  
First model, and it is believed “the shortest route to employment”. The social 
assistance recipients should accept any job that is available (Lodemel & Trickey, 
2002). So many Ontario Works recipients have to accept some low-salary or unstable 
job under the pressure of government.  So the Work-First model is a reason why 
Ontario Works cannot solve the “recidivism” problem effectively (Jennifer & Martin, 
2000).  
 
Finally, some researchers of Ontario Works use the framework of multi-level 
governance theory. And most literature in this field focuses on the provincial 
government’s “micro-management” of the local implementation of Ontario Works. 
The intervention of the provincial government includes two parts: the first is the 
funding model of Ontario Works and the second is the new Service Delivery Model 
of Ontario Works (Dean, Andrew & Ernie, 2006). According to the current funding 
model, local government also needs to cover parts of both administration costs and 
benefit costs of Ontario Works. (Commission for the Review of Social Assistance 
Ontario, 2012). And the provincial government provides different grants to 
municipalities based on the services they provide. It also has some incentive funds 
and financial punishment rules for different behaviors of municipalities in managing 
Ontario Works (Dean, Andrew & Ernie, 2006). Secondly, provincial government 
designed a new service delivery model to provide services. Each applicant should 
apply by telephone through one of seven “Intake Screening Units”, and then get a 
face-to-face interview in a local office. This two-step intake is the requirement of 
provincial government and all municipalities need to obey to this process (Dean Herd, 
2003). Besides, the cost paid to social assistance recipients are also calculated by the 
province-wide Service Delivery Management Technology automatically. And 
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municipalities do not have any flexibility to set the income support level in their 
jurisdictions. Therefore, the Service Delivery Model also showed the “micro-
management” of provincial government to Ontario Works (City of Toronto, 2003).  
 
3. The Variation of Ontario Works in Different Municipalities 
 
As discussed above, regional variation is accompanied with the decentralization 
process of social welfare services. With the financial retrenchment of federal 
government, it gives provinces more flexibility and spaces for the social assistance 
system. And from the perspective of provinces, they could choose to further 
decentralize this kind of services and empower municipalities to implement this 
policy. In 1990th, Ontario adopted the most aggressive social assistance reform. 
Although there are some arguments about to what extent provincial government gives 
flexibility to local government, it cannot be denied that compared with other 
provinces, the decentralization of social assistance in Ontario is more intensive. So 
the question here is under this system, how much power the provincial government 
gave to the municipalities, which could be reflected through the regional variation of 
Ontario Works. And this is the first research question of the paper. In order to find the 
answer, the paper compares the local implementation of Ontario Works in different 
municipalities. In Ontario, there are 444 municipalities in total, this research would 
choose 12 of them, which covers more than 70% of all Ontario citizens, to compare 
their variation in Ontario Works, and they are: Durham, Halton, Hamilton, London, 
Muskoka, Niagara, Ottawa, Sudbury (Greater), Toronto, Waterloo, Windsor and York. 
All public services could be analyzed from two perspectives:  the administration and 
the services. From the administration perspective, it focuses on the management of 
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the service delivery process, which is about through what mechanism the government 
provided these services. And for the services themselves, they are about what services 
are provided to the clients, what benefits they get from the policy. So when analyzing 
the regional variation of social assistance in Ontario, it could also be investigated 
from these two perspectives. The application process of Ontario Works could reflect 
the administrative variation of this policy in different municipalities. And the benefit 
level of clients could show the regional disparities of social assistance services. So in 
this paper, Ontario Works in the selected cities are compared in the fields of the cost 
of government, the application process, the benefit level of recipients and local 
variation over time. 
 
3.1 The Regional Variation of Government Cost in Ontario Works 
 
According to the study of Trydegard and Thorslund, government cost is an important 
indicator of the regional variation of social services in different municipalities4. It is 
logical to assume that if the regional disparities of social assistance were huge, the 
cost to provide this service in each region might be quite different. On the contrary, 
little regional variation of government cost is a sign of a strict resource allocation and 
more universal social assistance systems. It means in different places, government 
contributes similar amounts of resources to provide this service, which is an indicator 
of regional universalism.  
 
In the current funding model of Ontario Works, the provincial government and 
municipalities work together to cover the cost of Ontario Works. And municipalities 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Trydegard, G., Thorslund, M., Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, & 
Institutionen för socialt arbete - Socialhögskolan. (2010). One uniform welfare state or a multitude of 
welfare municipalities? the evolution of local variation in swedish elder care. Social Policy and 
Administration, 44(4), 495-511. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9515.2010.00725.x 
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have financial responsibility for both administrative costs and benefit cost of social 
assistance. For the administration cost of social assistance, generally speaking, it was 
eligible for a 50/50 cost sharing between provincial government and municipalities. 
But the financial supports from provincial government are not unlimited. The cost 
sharing was subject to unilateral caps imposed by the province. Any expenditure 
beyond the 50/50 cost sharing is 100% municipal. Those funding caps (in the range of 
$700 per case, with some flexibility depending on the client group5) were historical 
and not based on current caseload6. For the benefit cost, the OMBI report of 2011 said 
that the benefit cost could vary based on the caseload mix (single and family) and the 
types of benefits required. The Province mandates eligibility criteria and benefit 
amounts, resulting in generally an 80:20 Provincial: Municipal cost-share. Benefits 
provided by the municipality beyond this mandate are funded 100% by the 
Municipality7. And OMBI collected data about the government cost of Ontario Works 
in these 12 municipalities, from which it could be found out the government cost 
variation among them (see chart 1).  
 
 
 	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Ernie Lightman, Dean Herd, & Andrew Mitchell. (2006). Exploring the local implementation of 
ontario works. Studies in Political Economy, (78), 119. 6	  District of Sault Ste. Marie Social Services Administration Board Ontario Works Funding Issues 
Summary 
7 OMBI, 2011 Performance Measurement Report, October 23, 2012. 
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Chart 1. Monthly Government Cost (Provincial and Municipal) Of Ontario 
Works Per Case 	  
 
Data Resources: OMBI, 2011 Performance Measurement Report, October 23, 2012 
 
 
From Chart 1, it could be figured out that, no matter the administrative cost or benefit 
cost, the variation among different municipalities is small. In these 12 municipalities, 
the government cost of City of Toronto is the highest and it is about $1026 per case 
per month, and the region of Niagara is the lowest, which is $818. The gap between 
highest and lowest is $208, which is only 22.4% of the median. The standard 
deviation is 50. Therefore, in different regions, no matter whether big cities like 
Toronto and Ottawa, or the municipalities with comparative smaller populations, the 
provincial government invests similar amount of resources in providing Ontario 
Works in different places.  
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Chart 2 and Chart 3 present the comparison of the regional variation of municipality 
cost and province cost in Ontario Works. First, Chart 2 showed the provincial share of 
Ontario Works cost, and among these 12 municipalities, Toronto get the highest 
provincial government financial support per case, and it is $691/month, and the 
lowest level is in Sudbury, which is $563/month. The gap between highest and lowest 
is $128 per case per month. And this paper took use of the ratio of the gap and the 
median of the data in 12 municipalities as the variation indicator of the government 
cost. For the provincial cost, the gap-median ratio is 20.3%. And Chart 3 is about the 
municipal cost of Ontario Works in different regions. The average municipal cost in 
Ottawa is the highest and local government spends $338 per month per case. The 
municipal cost of the Region of Niagara is the lowest and it is $219 per case. And the 
gap of highest level and lowest level for 12 municipalities is $119, and the variation 
indicator is 39.8%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 2 & Chart 3. The Comparison of Provincial Cost and Municipal Cost of 
Ontario Works Per Case. 
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Data Resources: The indicator “Monthly Social Assistance Administration Operation Cost per Case” is 
from OMBI, and Yearly Total Cost on Social Assistance Administration per Case equals it times 12. 
The cap of provincial government in the administrative cost is $700 per case per year, so the Monthly 
Cost of Municipality on Social Assistance Administration per Case=(Yearly Total Cost on Social 
Assistance Administration per Case-700)/12. The data of “Monthly Benefit Cost on Social Assistance 
per Case” is from OMBI, since municipal government cover 20% of all the benefit cost, the Yearly 
Benefit Cost of Municipality on Social Assistance per Case= Monthly Benefit Cost on Social 
Assistance per Case*20%. The Monthly Municipal Cost Per Case=Municipal Administration Cost + 
Municipal Benefit Cost. And the Monthly Provincial Cost Per Case= Monthly Social Assistance 
Administration Operation Cost per Case - The Monthly Municipal Cost Per Case 
 
From this comparison, it can be seen that on the local level, the regional variation of 
municipal cost on Ontario Works is much higher than the variation on the provincial 
government level. On the one hand, it reflects that the financial burden of different 
municipalities is different. Because of the arbitrary funding cap of provincial 
government, municipalities bear most of the administration cost of social assistance 
system. It causes great financial burden to local government and severely limits the 
flexibility of municipalities in implementing the social assistance system. In many 
parts, the cost share of local government far exceeds 50%. Especially for some larger 
municipalities like Toronto and Ottawa, that serve more people and have higher 
turnover rate, the cost gap seems to be extremely low and create considerable local 
financial pressures. And they have to rely on the 100% municipal contributions to 
compensate for the lack of provincial funding in administrative costs. In this case, the 
different investments of municipalities to cover their financial cap cause the higher 
variation of government cost in Ontario Works on the local level. On the other hand, 
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based on this fact, it could be assumed that provincial government tends to give 
similar resources to different regions while the flexibility of local government might 
cause more variations, at least the variation in government funding.  
 
3.2 The Administrative Practices of Ontario Works in Different Municipalities 
 
A recent review of welfare reform initiatives across Canada concluded that 
administrative practices have as important an effect on outcomes as any other 
component of reform 8 . And for Ontario Works, the regional variation of 
administrative practices of government could reflect the regional difference of the 
whole policy. From the policy management perspective, the provincial government 
designed the New Service Delivery Model for the implementation of Ontario Works. 
This new system has been in operation across the province since January 2002 and 
includes the following key features: the provincial wide database to collect the case 
information of Ontario Works clients; the two-step intake process to verify the 
information of applicants; streamlined case management to reduce staff time on case 
administration by reducing and/or automating manual processes to track client 
information and the mandatory Consolidated Verification Process for those already 
receiving assistance.  
 
From the perspective of regional variation, the management system of Ontario Works 
in different regions is quite similar with each other because of the provincial-wide 
service delivery model. No matter which city the applicants live in, they need to apply 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Human Resources Development Canada (2000, March). Reconnecting social assistance, recipients to 
the labour market: Lessons learned. Ottawa: Human Resources Development Canada, Evaluation and 
Data Development Branch, Strategic Policy. SPAH123E-03-00. 	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for the social assistance benefits through the two-step intake process. The “First Stage 
Preliminary Assessment” was conducted by the seven provincial wide Intake 
Screening Unit (ISU), and the second stage was a face-to-face verification interview 
implemented at the local Ontario Works office. This represents a dramatic shift in the 
way people must apply for assistance. In each municipality, it has the application 
directives to help people apply for Ontario Works. Through comparing the application 
guidance of these 12 municipalities, it could be figured out that all of them ask 
potential clients to apply through the seven Intake Screening Unit at first. And ISU 
has the rights to approve or deny the application. Then, the applicants whose 
application was approved by ISU would be referring to the Ontario Works office for 
the second step. The applicants will be asked to attend a meeting at a local office. A 
caseworker will verify the information and determine the eligibility of applicant. So 
the two-step intake application mechanism is a standard process and was implemented 
in all municipalities. Although many municipalities expressed their concerns about 
this universal management system and noted that the technology has not been able to 
collect or report all the kinds of information they really need, only the City of Ottawa 
developed three additional local systems to collect information. And in other cities, 
they did not have any additional local administrative mechanisms.  
 
Besides, the provincial government also introduced the Consolidated Verification 
Process for people who have already received the assistance. The main purpose of this 
mechanism is to decrease the “fraud” in Ontario Works. And there are also some 
other mandatory requirements from provincial government in the implementation of 
Ontario Works such as the compulsory drug test. At the beginning of the policy, some 
municipalities were in period of opposition and reluctance because these mandates in 
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many ways ran counter to the local vision of welfare. For example, a major contention 
initially is the compulsive drug test, which raised problems for many delivery agents 
who hold the opinion that the mandatory drug test is a method to “scare” people away 
from social assistance system9. But the provincial government will impose financial 
punishments if municipalities refuse to take this system. And the paper found out that 
none of the 12 sample municipalities violates the rules of the provincial government. 
All the municipalities make use of New Service Delivery Model to provide Ontario 
Works services. And they fulfill all of the mandates of provincial government. This 
also reflects the similarity of the local management system of Ontario Works.  
 
3.3 The Benefit Variation of Ontario Works 
 
The benefit of Ontario Works has two envelopes: income assistance and employment 
support. And the paper would investigate the regional variation of Ontario Works in 
both fields.  
 
The Variation of Income Assistance 
 
As discussed above, there is a two-step intake process to apply for Ontario Works. 
The applicants need to provide personal information in both stages, and the Ontario 
Works service delivery system calculates the amount of income assistance 
automatically based on the information received.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Ernie Lightman, Dean Herd, & Andrew Mitchell. (2006). Exploring the local implementation of 
ontario works. Studies in Political Economy, (78), 119. 
	   21	  
Now, the provincial government takes use of Market Basket Measure to calculate the 
income support. The support “basket” includes food, clothing and footwear, 
transportation, shelter and other expenses. Among them, the amount of food support is 
calculated according to the cost of a National Nutritious Food Basket for a reference 
family in different regions. Clothing and footwear is based on the commercial price 
data of Statistics Canada. Transportation is the price of a monthly bus pass for an adult 
while the shelter part has two components: the median rent and utility costs of a two-
bedroom unit, and the maintenance fee of the rental unit. For other expenses, it is 
based on a list of 47 daily necessary services and goods. The sum of these five parts is 
the maximum amount of money the Ontario Works recipients could get. Therefore, the 
calculation of income assistance is based on objective criteria. And in different 
regions, the calculation formula is the same. OMBI collected the average cost of 
government in income support per case of Ontario Works. And here the paper can use 
this indicator to represent the income assistance level in each place. Chart 1 is about 
the average government cost of the income assistance in different municipalities, 
which represents on average, how much money a single person could get. And from 
the chart, it could be figured out that the variation of income assistance in different 
municipalities is not huge. Toronto has the highest income support standard, which is 
$661 per month for a single person. And the amount of income assistance in Sudbury 
is the lowest among 12 municipalities and it is $502 per month. The gap between the 
highest and the lowest is $159. The variation indicator (gap between highest and 
lowest/the median) of these 12 municipalities is 27.6%. So both the analysis of the 
calculation formula and the empirical study of the income assistance level show that 
the regional variation of the financial support level is small.  
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And in the report of Transforming Social Assistance in Ontario, it argued that the 
Market Basket Measurement (MBM) method is not a perfect measurement in the 
social assistance context. As a temporary program, social assistance is not designed to 
cover all expenses an individual or family may incur over the long term. The MBM 
looks at an ongoing standard of living, not a temporary one, and therefore represents a 
higher standard than social assistance can reasonably provide 10 . So the report 
suggested developing a new tool to calculate the financial support of Ontario Works 
recipients, which was called “Basic Measurement of Adequacy (BMA)”. Under this 
method, for the food, clothing and transportation part, the calculation formula of BMA 
is the same with MBM, but averaged for Ontario. And the shelter cost is based on 25th 
percentile of rent and utilities for two-and three-bedroom rental units in each region, 
but averaged for Ontario. The new income benefit calculation formula is no longer 
based on the price data of each region, but the average commodity price level of the 
whole province. So it is straightforward that if the provincial government took this 
new tool, the regional variation of income support level would further decrease. In the 
future, people in different regions would get the same amount of financial support 
under this new formula.  
 
	  
	  	  	  	  
	  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Commission for the Review of Social Assistance in Ontario, Brighter Prospects: Transforming 
Social Assistance in Ontario, 2012 
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Chart 4. The Average Government Cost of The Income Assistance in Different 
Municipalities 
 
 
Data Resources: the amount of income assistance the clients could get depends on their living 
arrangement, the size of their family and if any family member has income. OMBI collected the 
average cost of income support per case in Ontario Works. And here the paper use this indicator to 
represent the income assistance level in each place. OMBI, 2011 Performance Measurement Report, 
October 23, 2012 
 
Generally speaking, the provincial government hopes to establish an appropriate 
benefit structure that “reduces the barriers and support’s people’s transition into, and 
attachment with, the labor market”11. Therefore, the income assistance of Ontario 
Works is intended to help eligible applicants for the food, housing, clothing and other 
necessary personal needs. And the philosophy of the provincial government in income 
assistance is to satisfy the recipients’ basic needs. So it designed the support “basket” 
as the benchmark to define the basic needs of social assistance recipients. In this 
scenario, the amount of income assistance in different places varies with each other 
just because the cost of living in different municipalities is various, not because the 
social assistance recipients in different places have different living standards. On the 
contrary, Canada is often described as an institutional welfare state characterized by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Commission for the Review of Social Assistance in Ontario, Brighter Prospects: Transforming 
Social Assistance in Ontario, 2012 
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the value of equality and universality12. Affected by this, on the income assistance 
issue, the provincial government hopes that the living standard of all social assistance 
recipients, no matter which municipality they live in, are similar. This is the most 
important reason why municipalities do not have flexibility in income support. If the 
intention of policy designer were to provide similar “adequacy” to all clients, both the 
benchmark and the formula to calculate the income assistance would be the same in 
different places. And the commercial price in each region could be obtained from the 
statistics data. In this case, it is unnecessary to give municipalities flexibility to 
determine their own income support system. On the contrary, if the local government 
were offered this freedom to determine the income support level in their jurisdiction, 
it would inevitably lead to the unfairness among different regions. In the big, rich 
municipalities like Toronto, the Ontario Works clients might get more money and 
have higher living standard compared with clients in other regions, which would 
violate the fairness principle of social assistance. Therefore, the provincial 
government designed the whole income support system and calculated the amount of 
income support automatically. 
 
The Variation of Employment Services 
 
As discussed above, another envelope of Ontario Works is the employment service. 
An important aspect of the 1990s social assistance reform was the introduction of the 
employment services in Ontario Works. The provincial government designed this 
system and has some mandates relating to what employment services should be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Van Der Veen, Robert Jan, and Wouter Van Der Brug. 2013. Three worlds of social insurance: On 
the validity of esping-andersen's welfare regime dimensions. British Journal of Political Science 43 (2): 
323.	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provided by local Ontario Works offices. According to the Ontario Works Policy 
Directives of the Ministry of Community and Social Services, the Ontario Works 
benefits have two components: mandatory benefits and discretionary benefits. And 
mandatory benefits include full-time employment benefit (FTEB) and other 
employment and employment assistance activities benefits. The discretionary benefits 
part include vocational training, employment related expenses and child care 
assistance13. Furthermore, municipalities could also initiate other programs to satisfy 
the specific needs of clients in their own jurisdictions. The paper checked Ontario 
Works directives of all the 12 municipalities to find out what kinds of employment 
services each municipality offers. Chart 4 shows the regional variation of employment 
services. If the local Ontario Works office provide certain employment services, it 
was marked as “1” in the table, and if it was not, it was “0”.  
 
From the matrix, it can be figured out that at first, all of the municipalities provide the 
provincial government’s mandatory benefits. In all 12 municipalities, the employment 
benefits of Ontario Works cover the expenses associated with beginning full-time 
employment and other employment activities. And these benefits are the mandatories 
of provincial government. And the provincial government would cover 80% of the 
costs of these benefits. If the municipality failed to fulfill these requirements, they 
would be financially punished. Secondly, for the discretionary benefits part, most 
municipalities provide at least one of the three discretionary benefits, and only City of 
Toronto provided all of the three components of the discretionary benefits. Besides, 
the municipalities could provide other employment program to satisfy the specific 
needs of the recipients, and in these 12 sample municipalities, City of Toronto has a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  The Ministry of Community and Social Services, Ontario Works Policy Directives, January 2013	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new employment service plan in the community of Regent Park. "Towards a 
Neighborhood of Choice and Connection", which was developed by Employment and 
Social Services. This plan outlines specific goals to improve employment and training 
services for local residents and employers, and for transforming how services are 
delivered in Regent Park. From the analysis, it can be concluded that the employment 
benefits of different municipalities consist of the provincial mandatory benefits and 
some discretionary benefits, and most of them provide nothing else except for these 
requirements. So the benefits structure in different regions are similar. The regional 
variation is small in this field.  
 
Table 5. The Regional Variation of Employment Services 	  
 
 
And this situation could be attributed to the funding model of the benefit cost in 
Ontario Works. For the mandatory benefits, the provincial government would cover 
 
City 
Mandatory Benefits Discretionary Benefits Other specific program 
Full-time Employment 
Benefit 
Other Employment and 
Employment Activity Benefit 
Vocational 
Training 
Employment 
Related Expenses 
Child Care 
Assistance 
Other Specific 
Employment Program 
Durham 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Halton 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Hamilton 1 1 0 0 1 0 
London 1 1 0 1 1 0 
Muskoka 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Niagara 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Ottawa 1 1 0 1 1 0 
Sudbury 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Toronto 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Waterloo 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Winsor 1 1 0 0 1 0 
York 1 1 0 1 0 0 
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80% of the costs, and the provincial share of the discretionary benefits cost is lower. 
Provincial government would give some financial support to provide discretionary 
benefits but the ratio is less than 80%. Finally, the costs beyond the mandatory and 
discretionary benefits are 100% covered by municipalities. Since municipalities 
would get different funds when providing different employment services. In order to 
maximize the budget they get from provincial government, municipalities tend to 
provide employment services cost-shared by provinces. Therefore, the current funding 
model motivates municipalities to provide employment services that would be 
financially supported by senior government. So the employment services in different 
regions are similar with each other. Besides, the provincial government also allocates 
some short-term supplementary funds to local governments, and this kind of 
“incentive budget” could further encourage municipalities to act under the framework 
of provincial government, thus further limiting the regional variation of Ontario 
Works. For example, the provincial government hoped that social assistance 
recipients could participate in Community Placements (which are unpaid community 
services that provide participants with the experience to move into the paid labor 
force with improved skills and self-confidence). So they established the Ontario 
Works Placement Innovation Fund to support the development of new and innovative 
CP placements. With every placement exceeding the prior year’s target, the local 
service delivery agents could get an incentive payment of $500. On this occasion, 
municipalities would focus on providing Community Placements in their employment 
support program. The empirical study of the paper also confirms  this point. All of the 
12 sample municipalities have the Community Placement program. Therefore, on the 
one hand, municipalities get different amounts of financial support for the different 
employment services, and on the other hand, the senior government has some 
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“incentive fund” to encourage them to provide certain kinds of benefits. These two 
factors work together to force municipalities to offer the mandatory and priority 
benefits of senior governments, which causes the similarity of employment services in 
different regions.  
 
4. The Balance Between Universalism and Local Autonomy in Ontario Works 
 
From the discussion above, it can be concluded that the regional variation of Ontario 
Works is limited and different municipalities provide similar Ontario Works services 
to the clients, but Ontario Works is still a provincial-municipal cooperative program 
rather than being solely provided by the provincial government itself. So there is a 
dilemma between the universalism characteristic of the policy and local autonomy. 
On the one hand, since Ontario Works is such a universal system across the province, 
why do not provincial government provide this system by itself like other provinces 
do? Why they still need to cooperate with municipalities to implement this policy? 
And on the other hand, if the provincial government thought that municipalities also 
play an important role in the implementation of social assistance system, why they did 
not give them more flexibility to satisfy the specific needs of clients in their own 
jurisdictions? If local government did not have much freedom in Ontario Works, what 
is the meaning of asking them to get involved in this process? The following part is 
trying to answer these questions.  
 
4.1 The Context To Build the Social Assistance System 
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First, on the macro level, Canada could be categorized as an institutional welfare state. 
In Esping-Anderson’s book “The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism”, it defines 
three kinds of welfare states. Although this book was based on research about 
European countries, other welfare states, including Canada could also be analyzed 
under this framework. According to Esping-Anderson, the categorization of welfare 
states is abased on three principles: public-private relationship, decommodification 
and marketization14. In Canada, generally speaking, the public sector is still playing 
the key role in providing social welfare services. Government designed the whole 
system as well as determined the policy details. They regulated what kinds of services 
should be provided to the clients and developed a whole system to deliver these 
services. So although the public sector contracted out some services to the for-profit 
or non-profit organizations, it is still the government that makes final decisions. So 
from the perspective of public-private relationships, the public sector dominates in the 
field of social welfare in Canada. Besides, as to the commercialization, according to 
the definition of Esping-Anderson, when a service existed as the result of civil rights 
or a person could make a living independent on market, the decommodification 
appeared.  On this level, the social assistance system in Canada is a process of 
decommodification. It would provide low-income families with financial support and 
other welfare services to insure every citizen could live a decent life even they did not 
participate in market activities. Because of these characteristics, Canada represents 
the Social Democratic welfare state regime, in which all citizens are incorporated 
under one universal system.  
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  Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. 
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To some extent, the regional variation of social welfare policy depends on what kind 
of welfare state the country is. Based on this theory, Canada could be placed in a 
special welfare state model, “a universal citizenship-based model with a high level of 
generosity”. And this model is based on a high degree of universalism and equality. 
Another important characteristic of this model is to minimize dependence on families, 
with the government taking responsibility for the care of children, the seniors, and 
low-income groups. Therefore, this kind of welfare states is not only a “social 
insurance state”, but also a “social service” state. And there are some characteristics 
of universalism here. Suggested by Anttonen, benefits and services should be based in 
legislation, tax-funded, open to all citizens in need, no matter their place of residence-
---services should be equal in different places15. Therefore, in the traditional welfare 
country like Canada, although the egalitarianism of social welfare policy is 
considered weakening after the social welfare reform, justice and fairness is still a 
basic principle of government when designing the domestic social welfare system. 
And the regional variation was considered as a kind of “unfairness” in social welfare.  
 
Research shows that flexibility of local government would lead to the regional 
variation in the social welfare services. As Gronlie and Kroger said, if the 
municipalities enjoy a great freedom to determine the scope and quality of their 
services, and at the individual level, to determine eligibility criteria as well as the 
amount and kind of help to be delivered, the regional variation would be inevitable16. 
Even though some empirical studies figured out that this kind of variation is structural 
rather than political, which means the differences only show people’s different needs 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Anttonen, A. (2002), Universalism and social policy: a Nordic-feminist revaluation, NORA, 10, 2: 
71–80. 16	  Gronlie, Kroger (1997), Local government in Scandinavia: autonomous or integrated into the 
welfare state? The Key to the Scandinavia Welfare Model. Aldershot, Avebury 
	   31	  
in social welfare services rather than reflect people in different places enjoy different 
social welfare level, this variation was still considered as unfairness politically. So 
strong local autonomy can lead to large variations in the distribution of municipal 
services. And from the perspective of social assistance, the differences across local 
government would be great in terms of coverage, accessibility, costs and the social 
assistance level. The macro context determined that Canada, as a traditional welfare 
state, would regard equality and fairness as a basic principle to design the social 
assistance system. So the large regional variation was unacceptable under this 
background. This is why the provincial government does not give great freedom to 
municipalities in providing social assistance services.  
 
4.2 The Philosophy of the Provincial Government in Ontario Works 
 
On the micro-level, during the Progressive Conservative years in office (1995-2003), 
Ontario was in the forefront of work-based social assistance reform. And a basic 
principle of Ontario Works on provincial level is to build an employment-oriented 
social assistance system. When providing employment services, there are two 
competing approaches: Human Capital Development model (HCD) and the Labor 
Force Attachment (LFA). HCD model seeks to improve the long-term employability 
of welfare recipients through education and skills development and to help them find 
stable jobs, providing family-supporting wages. So the HCD model focuses on 
integrating employment services with the labor market and human resources 
development, which is a long-term program trying to help people solve their 
unemployment problems in the long run. In stark contrast, the LFA or “work-first” 
model favors individual explanations of poverty and unemployment that stress 
deficient education or work experience, and/or moral failings such as poor work 
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habits. Structural variables such as labor demand and the nature of employment 
opportunities are downplayed17. So under the LFA model, government would try to 
initiate a program that could build a “shortest route to employment”. The basic 
principle of this model is to encourage the clients to come to work as soon as possible, 
no matter what kind of jobs they could find.  
 
The employment services of Ontario Works are based on the LFA model. The 
philosophy of the provincial government is to transfer the Ontario social assistance 
system from a negative financial support program to a positive employment-oriented 
one, and help them to get rid of welfare dependence. In the new system, all jobs are 
considered as “good job”. The Ontario Works recipients need to accept any positions 
they could get in order to build the “shortest route” between social assistance clients 
and employment. And this principle could also be reflected from the evaluation 
benchmark system of Ontario Works. In Ontario, OMBI reports are important for 
comparing the performance of different municipalities in providing services. And 
since OMBI was implemented in the public sector, the measurements OMBI use 
could tell a story about what aspects the government think are the most important to 
evaluate the performance of local government. In the social assistance part of OMBI 
report, it made use of five indicators to compare the social assistance performance of 
different municipalities, and three of them are measurements about how long people 
stay in the system and how fast they find a job. Besides, there are some empirical 
studies that can prove this point as well. As the research of Dean, Andrew and Ernie 
showed, one of the main purposes of the 1990s social assistance reform is to decrease 
the number of recipients through design. In order to achieve this goal, for one thing, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17 Peck, J. and Theodore, N. (2000) “‘Work first’: workfare and the regulation of contingent labour 
markets” Cambridge Journal of Economics 24: 119-138. 	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the policy has some strict eligiblity requirements to “scare” people away from the 
system. And in addition, it made use of LFA model in employment services to 
minimize recipients’ time to stay in the program18. Therefore, from the perspective of 
the provincial government, a basic principle behind the employment services of 
Ontario Works is to help people find job as quickly as possible.  
 
However, sometimes, the “work-first” philosophy of Ontario Works is in conflict with 
the municipality’s understanding of social assistance. Before the introduction of 
Ontario Works, some municipalities like Toronto had already provided employment 
services to the clients. And the employment services in City of Toronto before 
Ontario Works were integrated with other aspects like education, economic 
development and labor market. Even until now, in some government reports of City 
of Toronto, they still appeal to build an employment support system that could have a 
closer relationship with the bigger labor context rather than just help clients to find a 
job. In this scenario, it could be concluded that different municipalities have different 
focuses in employment services. So if local government had more autonomy in 
Ontario Works, the regional variation of employment services would be greater. Some 
municipalities would take HCD model to invest in human resources while some are 
more interested in the LFA model. However, the philosophy of provincial government 
is to build an employment-oriented social assistance system to help the clients find a 
shortest route to work. In this situation, the employment program based on HCD 
model violates the basic principle of provincial government in this field. So the 
provincial government would not allow local governments the freedom to determine 
which employment services model they use. Therefore, the work-first philosophy of 	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  Dean Herd. "Cutting Caseloads by Design: The Impact of the New Service Delivery Model for 
Ontario Works." Canadian Review of Social Policy.51 (2003): 114. Print. 
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provincial government is also an important reason why regional autonomy in Ontario 
Works is limited.  
 
4.3 Fiscal Retrenchment and Decentralization Process of Social Assistance 
 
As discussed above, since the election of Mike Harris Conservative government, 
Ontario has experienced a turbulent provincial-local relationship. The Mike Harris 
government made radical changes affecting municipalities and their relationship with 
senior governments. And these changes are reflected in two aspects: the fiscal 
retrenchment of provincial government and the “who does what” model of delivering 
social services. Ontario Works reform is under this background. And this is the reason 
why provincial government does not provide Ontario Works by itself like some other 
provinces do. 
 
First, in 1990s, a fiscal crisis and a change in the design of intergovernmental 
transfers all contributed to demands on provincial governments that they make 
difficult choices about which spending programs they would expand and which they 
would contract. To some extent, there is a positive relationship between the cost-share 
of different levels of government and its power in social policy. For example, before 
the social assistance reform, the federal government covered 50% of the cost in social 
assistance. So the federal government had some requirements relating to the social 
assistance system in all provinces. Federal transfer funds were on the condition that 
all provinces should provide social assistance to all people who are “in need” without 
any attached strings. And after the financial retrenchment of federal government in 
social assistance, CAP was replaced by the Canada Health and Social Transfer 
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(CHST). At the same time, the federal government removed all the standards 
associated with the provincial social assistance system and the only requirement for 
this transfer was a prohibition on provincial residency requirements. From this fact, it 
would be figured out that when federal government shared the cost of social 
assistance, it would have some specific requirements on the policy implementation. 
And when the federal dollars decrease, its control on the system would decline at the 
same time. This theory could also be used to explain the provincial-municipal 
relationship in Ontario Works. The introduction of Ontario Works was under the 
context of provincial financial crisis and fiscal retrenchment. According to what has 
discussed above, if the provincial government implemented a universal and 
provincial-wide social assistance system, it has to fund most of the program costs. But 
under the background of fiscal retrenchment, the provincial government hoped that 
municipalities could undertake part costs of Ontario Works. In this case, it has to give 
some flexibility to the local government. And this is a reason why provincial 
government does not build a universal social assistance system by itself.  
 
Besides, another reason for the municipal involvement is the decentralization trend in 
public sector when conducting the social assistance reform. After Mike Harris 
government came into power, it developed the “Who Does What” model (WDW). 
And the provincial government hoped that it could reduce duplication and overlap in 
service delivery through further clarifying the responsibilities of different levels of 
governments. Therefore, the provincial-municipal relationship in Ontario Works was 
determined by the provincial government’s understanding of the “Who Does What” in 
social assistance. Affected by the New Public Management theory, local government 
was considered as more efficient to provide social services. At that time, the 
	   36	  
Conservative argued that service delivery was governed too much by the provincial 
government, and reducing this control would result in cost-saving. This idea was 
based on the theory that overlap and duplication within government was bad and the 
government would be more efficient through eliminating this kind of “waste”. In 
social assistance, Ontario Works is an employment-oriented program and government 
not only needs to provide financial support but also offer employment services to 
clients. Therefore, Ontario Works is also a service delivery issue. And 
decentralization was considered as an important way to increase efficiency in 
providing public services. On the municipal level, local government has some 
traditional employment programs towards young people, new immigrants and 
unemployment groups. So in order to decrease the duplication and eliminate the 
“waste”, it is clear that the province hoped to integrate the employment services of 
Ontario Works with the pre-existing community employment programs, which is a 
reason why the provincial government implemented financial support program by 
itself while relying on local government for the employment services.  
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Appendix: 
Chart 1.  
 
Municipality 
 
Monthly Social Assistance 
Administration Operating Cost per 
Case 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yearly Total Cost on Social 
Assistance Administration per Case 
 
 
 
 
2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 
Durham 262.56 227.46 242.28 3150.72 2729.52 2907.36 
Halton 239.37 250.56 220.21 2872.44 3006.72 2642.52 
Hamilton 176.27 171.3 167.52 2115.24 2055.6 2010.24 
London 171 181.02 189.88 2052 2172.24 2278.56 
Muskoka 264.62 261.77 273.18 3175.44 3141.24 3278.16 
Niagara 150.84 151.64 142.85 1810.08 1819.68 1714.2 
Ottawa 246.95 251.26 253.69 2963.4 3015.12 3044.28 
Sudbury 244.2 219.63 226.25 2930.4 2635.56 2715 
Toronto 222.66 244.89 234.48 2671.92 2938.68 2813.76 
Waterloo 205.22 202.59 184.89 2462.64 2431.08 2218.68 
Winsor 135.45 160.23 165.94 1625.4 1922.76 1991.28 
York 227.75 212.74 207.77 2733 2552.88 2493.24 
Median 225.21 216.19 213.99 2702.52 2594.28 2567.88 
The indicator “Monthly Social Assistance Administration Operation Cost per Case” is 
from OMBI, and Yearly Total Cost on Social Assistance Administration per Case 
equals it times 12.  
 
Chart 2.  
Municipality Yearly Cost of Municipality on 
Social Assistance Administration per 
Case 
The Cost-Share Ratio of Municipality 
on Social Assistance Administration 
2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 
Durham 1750.72 1329.52 1507.36 0.78 0.74 0.76 
Halton 1472.44 1606.72 1242.52 0.76 0.77 0.74 
Hamilton 715.24 655.6 610.24 0.67 0.66 0.65 
London 652 772.24 878.56 0.66 0.68 0.69 
Muskoka 1775.44 1741.24 1878.16 0.78 0.78 0.79 
Niagara 410.08 419.68 314.2 0.61 0.62 0.59 
Ottawa 1563.4 1615.12 1644.28 0.76 0.77 0.77 
Sudbury 1530.4 1235.56 1315 0.76 0.73 0.74 
Toronto 1271.92 1538.68 1413.76 0.74 0.76 0.75 
Waterloo 1062.64 1031.08 818.68 0.72 0.71 0.68 
Winsor 225.4 522.76 591.28 0.57 0.64 0.65 
York 1333 1152.88 1093.24 0.74 0.73 0.72 
Median 1302.52 1194.28 1167.88 0.74 0.73 0.73 
The cap of provincial government in the administrative cost is $700 per case per year, 
so the Yearly Cost of Municipality on Social Assistance Administration per 
Case=Yearly Total Cost on Social Assistance Administration per Case-700. And The 
Cost-share Ratio of Municipality on Social Assistance Administration=(Yearly Total 
Cost on Social Assistance Administration per Case-700)/ Yearly Total Cost on Social 
Assistance Administration per Case.  
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Chart 3.  
Municipality Monthly Benefit Cost on Social 
Assistance per Case 
Yearly Benefit Cost of Municipality 
on Social Assistance per Case 
2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 
Durham 701.81 683.81 699.33 1684.344 1641.144 1678.392 
Halton 715.15 723.77 718.09 1716.36 1737.048 1723.416 
Hamilton 756.18 759.86 739.3 1814.832 1823.664 1774.32 
London 693.52 706.88 703.41 1664.448 1696.512 1688.184 
Muskoka 623.72 652.29 662.78 1496.928 1565.496 1590.672 
Niagara 665.19 701.72 675.17 1596.456 1684.128 1620.408 
Ottawa 709.59 718.14 712.16 1703.016 1723.536 1709.184 
Sudbury 599.8 620.66 630.46 1439.52 1489.584 1513.104 
Toronto 796.56 794.08 791.39 1911.744 1905.792 1899.336 
Waterloo 734.29 731.34 728.57 1762.296 1755.216 1748.568 
Winsor 741.03 763.84 767.34 1778.472 1833.216 1841.616 
York 727.83 730.59 732.69 1746.792 1753.416 1758.456 
Median 712.37 720.96 715.13 1709.688 1730.304 1716.312 
The data of “Monthly Benefit Cost on Social Assistance per Case” is from OMBI, 
since municipal government cover 20% of all the benefit cost, the Yearly Benefit Cost 
of Municipality on Social Assistance per Case= Monthly Benefit Cost on Social 
Assistance per Case*20%*12. 
 
 
Chart 4.  
Municipality Yearly Cost of Municipality on Social 
Assistance per Case 
The Cost Ratio of Municipality on 
Social Assistance 
2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 
Durham 4135.064 3707.912 3885.752 0.36 0.34 0.34 
Halton 3888.8 4030.136 3665.936 0.34 0.34 0.33 
Hamilton 3230.072 3129.92 3084.56 0.29 0.28 0.28 
London 3016.448 3160.424 3266.744 0.29 0.30 0.30 
Muskoka 3972.368 4031.912 4168.832 0.37 0.37 0.37 
Niagara 2706.536 2740.088 2634.608 0.28 0.27 0.27 
Ottawa 3966.416 4024.304 4053.464 0.35 0.35 0.35 
Sudbury 3669.92 3448.664 3528.104 0.36 0.34 0.34 
Toronto 3883.664 4138.016 4013.096 0.32 0.33 0.33 
Waterloo 3524.936 3479.648 3267.248 0.31 0.31 0.30 
Winsor 2703.872 3064.376 3132.896 0.26 0.28 0.28 
York 3779.792 3611.336 3551.696 0.33 0.32 0.31 
Median 3712.208 3610.592 3584.192 0.33 0.32 0.32 
The Yearly Cost of Municipality on Social Assistance per Case=Yearly Cost of 
Municipality on Social Assistance Administration per Case+ Yearly Cost of 
Municipality on Social Assistance Benefit per Case. The cost Ratio of Municipality 
on Social Assistance= Yearly Cost of Municipality on Social Assistance per 
Case/Yearly Total Cost of Social Assistance per Case. 
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Chart 5.  
Municipality The Cost Ratio of Municipality on 
Social Assistance Before The Reform 
The Cost Ratio of Municipality on 
Social Assistance After The Reform 
2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 
Durham 0.36 0.34 0.34 0.21 0.19 0.19 
Halton 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.19 0.20 0.17 
Hamilton 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.13 0.12 0.12 
London 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.13 0.14 0.15 
Muskoka 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.23 0.22 0.24 
Niagara 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.11 0.11 0.10 
Ottawa 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.20 0.20 0.20 
Sudbury 0.36 0.34 0.34 0.22 0.19 0.20 
Toronto 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.16 0.18 0.17 
Waterloo 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.16 0.15 0.13 
Winsor 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.08 0.11 0.12 
York 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.18 0.16 0.16 
Median 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.18 0.17 0.17 
 
 
